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NOTES & COMMENTS
TAXES AND BOUNTIES BURDENING
INTERSTATE COMMERCE: DISTINGUISHING
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE FROM ALEXANDRIA
SCRAP
The Supreme Court has long construed the commerce clause of
the Constitution' as forbidding states to enact legislation that dis-
criminates against out-of-state businesses in interstate commerce.2 In
two recent cases the Court considered different state statutory
schemes, one involving the taxation of securities transfers3 and the
other designed to give subsidies for the removal and destruction of
abandoned motor vehicles,4 both of which had this discriminatory
effect. However, while the Court struck down the securities transfer
tax, it upheld the state subsidy. Examination of the factors relied on
by the Court to reach opposite results in these cases reveals an incon-
sistency in the constitutional analysis and a need for more precise
definition of the boundaries of permissible state regulation of inter-
state commerce.
Since its enactment in 1905, the New York State securities trans-
fer tax statute5 and its amendments have been the subject of several
constitutional attacks.6 In the most recent of such cases, Boston
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 provides in part that "[tihe Congress shall have
power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."
2 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 606-07 (1977); Hallibur-
ton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963); Nippert v. Richmond,
327 U.S. 416, 433-34 (1946); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880); Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 277 (1876).
3 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599 (1977).
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 270-281 (McKinney 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
6 In New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907), the original statute
imposing a tax of two cents per one hundred dollars of face value or fraction thereof of
stock sold or transferred in New York, 1905 N.Y. Laws, ch. 241, § 1, survived claims
that it violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the
Court iri Hatch heard arguments as to the constitutionality of the statute under the
commerce clause, that case left the question undecided since the transaction at issue
was intrastate only, and the plaintiffs therefore lacked standing to raise the issue. 204
U.S. at 160-61. A 1906 amendment, 1906 N.Y. Laws, ch. 414 § 1, which changed the
standard of taxation to two cents per share of one hundred dollars of face value or
fraction thereof, was held unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unfair method of classi-
980 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,7 regional stock exchanges'
sought a declaratory judgment from a New York state court' to the
effect that a 1968 amendment"0 to the statute was an unconstitutional
discrimination against interstate commerce. Plaintiffs alleged that
the amended law imposed a greater tax burden on securities transac-
tions involving out-of-state sales than those involving in-state sales."
While the trial court denied the defendant State Tax Commission's
motion to dismiss," the Appellate Division reversed and declared the
1968 amendment constitutional." The Court of Appeals of New York
unanimously affirmed." On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals' judgment, holding
that the amendment violated the "free trade purpose of the Com-
merce Clause.""
fication, thereby reactiviating the original tax scheme. People ex. rel. Farrington v.
Mensching, 187 N.Y. 8, 79 N.E. 884 (1907). Notwithstanding Farrington, the New York
legislature in 1913 enacted an amendment that taxed shares of stock without nominal
or par value at the rate of two cents per share, and not per dollar amount of face value.
1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 779, § 1. In addition, a 1932 amendment imposed an additional
emergency tax equal to the amount previously payable. 1932 N.Y. Laws, ch. 62, § 270-
a. In 1933 the legislature extended the "per share" method of taxation to sales or
transfers of any kind of stock, not just shares without par value, and the rate imposed
was one and one-half cents per share of stock selling for less than $20 per share, and
two cents per share for all others selling above that price. 1933 N.Y. Laws, ch. 643, §§
2,3. While this method of "per share" taxation was in apparent conflict with the
Farrington decision, the New York Court of Appeals in Vaughan v. State, 272 N.Y.
102, 5 N.E.2d 53 (1936), appeal dismissed, 300 U.S. 638 (1937), held the tax constitu-
tional as applied to non-par stock, in effect overruling Farrington.
In O'Kane v. State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E.2d 905 (1940), the Court of Appeals of
New York addressed the issue expressly left open in Hatch-whether § 270, as
amended, discriminated against interstate commerce. In a 4-3 decision, the court held
that the tax was not discriminatory and therefore constitutional. 283 N.Y. at 442, 28
N.E.2d at 909.
7 97 S. Ct. 599 (1977).
9 Joining as plaintiffs with the Boston Stock Exchange were the Cincinnati, De-
troit, Midwest, Pacific Coast and Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington (PBW) stock
exchanges. Id. at 602 n.1.
I No federal court had jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, since an adequate
remedy could be obtained in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
"1 N.Y. TAX LAw § 270-a (McKinney Cur. Supp. 1976). The plaintiffs challenged
only the constitutionality of the amendment, not of § 270 itself. Boston Stock Exch.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 603 (1977).
" Id. at 602.
12 Id. The trial court's memorandum decision is unreported.
"Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 45 App. Div.2d 365, 357 N.Y.S.2d
116 (1974).
11 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 337 N.E.2d 758, 375
N.Y.S.2d 308 (1975).
" Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 610 (1977). In the state
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
Section 270 of the New York Tax Code imposes a tax on all sales,
agreements to sell and all deliveries or transfers of shares or certifi-
cates of stock'" made in New York." Before section 270-a took effect, 8
the rate of tax imposed varied with the price and number of shares
involved,'" but did not differentiate according to whether the sale of
securities took place in-state or out-of-state. Section 270-a altered the
transfer tax by establishing different tax rates dependent upon
whether the sale preceding an in-state transfer or delivery occurred
in-state or out-of-state. While a transfer of title to shares of stock may
occur in New York, the actual sale of these shares preceding such a
transfer is a separate event which can occur outside of New York. The
statute granted two major tax advantages to taxable transactions
involving in-state sales. First, a maximum tax of $350 applied to a
transaction involving an in-state sale, whereas all other transactions
were taxed at rates that, in the case of block sales of stock, resulted
in a much higher tax. For example, a large investor who both sold and
transferred stock in New York would have had his tax liability lim-
ited to $350, whereas an investor who transferred shares in New York
court plaintiffs also argued that § 270-a was unconstitutional under the privileges and
immunities clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV. § 2, and the equal protection clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV. Plaintiffs abandoned these arguments on appeal to the Supreme
Court and presented only the commerce clause issue. 97 S. Ct. at 602 n.2.
"1 N.Y. TAX LAW § 270(1)(McKinney 1966). "The fact that two or more of the
taxable events. . . occur within the State of New York with respect to a single transac-
tion does not mean that more than one tax is imposed; only one tax is payable with
respect to any one transaction." Rules and Regs. under the New York Tax Law, Title
20, § 440.1, reprinted in 2 STATS TAX REP., N.Y. 57-102(c)(CCH 1973).
11 Exceptions exist for transactions involving, inter alia, transfers of stock from a
fiduciary to his nominee, from an owner to a custodian of certificates, and mere loans
of stock or certificates. N.Y. TAX LAw § 270(5)(a-k)(McKinney 1966 & Cum. Supp.
1976).
" Section 270-a became effective on July 1, 1969.
" N.Y. TAx LAw § 270(2)(McKinney 1966) states:
The tax imposed by this section shall be two cents for each share,
except in cases where the shares or certificates are sold, in which cases
the tax shall be at the rate of one cent for each share where the selling
price is less than five dollars per share; two cents for each share where
the selling price is five dollars or more per share and less than ten
dollars per share; three cents for each share where the selling price is
ten dollars or more per share and less than twenty dollars per share
and four cents for each share where the selling price is twenty dollars
or more per share.
A stamp is required to be affixed to the stock certificate or corporate books as evidence
of payment of the tax. Id. at § 270(4). On July 8, 1975, a 25% tax surcharge on all taxes
computed under § 270 and § 270-a became effective. N.Y. TAX LAw § 270-d (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976).
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but effected the sale in New Jersey would have paid tax at the regular
rate without regard to the $350 limit. 0 Second, non-residents2 who
undertook transactions involving an in-state sale as opposed to an
out-of-state sale would have been accorded a 50% discount in the
amount of tax due. Thus, a Massachusetts resident who both sold
and transferred stock in New York would have paid only one-half the
amount of tax he would have paid if he had transferred the stock in
New York but sold it on the Boston exchange.
22
20 An example of the operation of the maximum tax provision is as follows:
X, a large investor, e.g., a pension fund, wishes to sell 100,000 shares
of ABC Company common stock. [It is assumed that the stock sells
for more than $20 per share, since stock selling for less than that
amount is subject to a lower tax rate]. If X sells on the New York
Stock Exchange and transfers record ownership or effects delivery in
New York, it pays only the maximum tax, i.e., $350. If instead it sells
-on an out-of-state exchange and transfers or delivers in New York, it
must pay the regular rate of $.05 per share, or a total of $5,000.
Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
21 A "non-resident" is an individual who is not a dealer or member of an in-state
securities exchange, is not domiciled in New York, and does not maintain a permanent
place of business or employment in the state. N.Y. TAX LAW § 270-a(1)(b) (McKin-
ney Cum. Supp. 1976).
2 An example of the operation of the non-resident discount is as follows:
Y, a non-New York resident, wishes to sell 100 shares of ABC Com-
pany common stock. If Y sells on an out-of-state exchange and trans-
fers record ownership or effects delivery in New York, he pays a rate
of $.05 per share for a total tax of $5.00. If, on the other hand, Y sells
on the New York Stock Exchange and transfers or delivers in New
York, he pays a tax calculated at a rate of exactly half as much, i.e.,
$.025 per share. In the latter case, Y pays half as much tax not because
he is a non-resident, but because he is a non-resident who sold within
New York State rather than outside it.
Brief for Appellants, supra note 20, at 8. After the decision of the court of appeals in
this case but before its disposition by the Supreme Court, a Congressional amendment
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 rendered void one challenged application of §
270-a. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21(2)(d), 89 Stat. 161
(amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(d)), provides in part that
No State . . . shall impose any tax on securities which are deposited
in or retained by a registered clearing agency [or] registered transfer
agent. . . unless such securities would otherwise be taxable by such
State . . . if the facilities of such registered clearing agency [or]
registered transfer agent. . . were not physically located in the taxing
State ....
The State recognized that this law prohibits taxation under § 270-a where "the sole
event in New York State is the delivery or transfer to or by a 'registered clearing
agency' or a 'registered transfer agent' . . . ... Release of the State of New York
Department of Taxation and Finance (Dec. 1, 1975), reprinted in 2 STATE TAX REP.,
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
Plaintiffs alleged that since section 270-a imposed an unequal tax
burden on out-of-state sales as opposed to sales made in New York,
the amendment unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate
commerce.n In response,2 the state offered two main grounds for
N.Y., % 57-101, .605.(CCH 1976). Thus, any taxation of securities transfers preceded
by an out-of-state sale when transfer is effected by a registered transfer agent would
not be taxable. A "transfer agent" is a person who, on the behalf of an issuer of
securities, engages in countersigning, exchanging, converting, or registering the trans-
fer of securities, as well as transferring xecord ownership of securities by bookkeeping
entry without physical issuance of securities certificates. Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(25) (Supp. V 1975). Pub. L. No. 94-29, however, did not erase
completely the types of transfers to which § 270-a would have given favorable tax
treatment, thereby encouraging sales of securities in New York to the detriment of the
plaintiff exchanges. If a New York resident were to sell a block of securities to another
resident and effect delivery in New York; there would have been a greater tax due if
the preceding sale occurs out-of-state rather than in-state, and Pub. L. No. 94-29 is
not applicable. Similarly, if an in-state transfer of securities were to be carried out by
a person other than a registered transfer agent, Pub. L. No. 94-29 would not change
the favorable tax treatment that would have been given by § 270-a to in-state sales.
See Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at App. G, Boston Stock Exch. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599 (1977).
2 The commerce clause does not merely serve as an authorization to Congress to
legislate for the safeguarding and encouragement of interstate commerce; rather, the
clause "even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the
power of the States." Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71
(1976); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946), citing Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373 (1946); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Burdens upon interstate
commerce imposed by a state pursuant to its taxing powers have been subject to closer
scrutiny than burdens flowing from an exercise of police power, since the state presum-
ably may derive the same tax revenue through taxation of sources other than interstate
commerce. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. at 253. Nor may a state "justify what amounts
to a levy upon the very process of commerce across State lines by pointing to a similar
hobble on its local trade." Id. at 254. The sale of intangibles such as securities is
commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause. Id. at 258-59.
21 In addition to the claim that § 270-a did not violate the commerce clause, the
state argued in the lower courts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 602 n.3 (1977). Addressing
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court noted that state courts
have the power to decide cases involving federal constitutional rights where neither the
Constitution nor federal statute withdraws jurisdiction. Id. See note 9 supra. Secondly,
the Court held that the exchanges had met the two-part test for establishing standing
laid down in Association of Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Since
plaintiffs' allegation established that the higher tax imposed by § 270-a on out-of-state
sales of securities diverted business from their facilities to those in New York, the
amendment caused them "injury in fact," and a case or controversy existed. Id. at 152.
Moreover, the exchanges' right to free competition was "arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected. . . by the. . . constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at
153. Thus, the plaintiffs had standing to sue both in their own right and on behalf of
19771
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upholding the statute.25 First, the defendant argued that since the
unamended version of section 270 actually discouraged sales in New
York when no other taxable event occurred in-state," the amendment
should have been viewed as compensatory legislation intended to
neutralize New York's competitive disadvantage and therefore as in-
offensive to the commerce clause.Y Second, the state maintained that
the favorable treatment by section 270-a of out-of-state sales would
have had no practical effect on interstate commerce regardless of
whether a sale involved residents or non-residents. Respondent relied
on the court of appeals' statement that "it is more than likely...
their members. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 602 n.3 (1977).
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).
1 In addition to the arguments set out in the text, the state also urged that § 270-
a should have been sustained because it was a tax imposed on a local event at the end
of interstate commerce, and the commerce clause does not prohibit the taxing of an
intrastate transfer of property that has flowed through interstate commerce. Boston
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 608 n.12 (1977). Cf. Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (ad valorem tax imposed on goods at end of foreign
commerce not violative of import-export clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 2);
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940) (state sales tax
imposed on transfer of property at end of interstate commerce not violative of com-
merce clause). The Supreme Court disposed of the argument in a footnote, reasoning
that § 270-a impermissibly discriminated between transactions on the basis of an
interstate element, see International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322
U.S. 340, 349 (1944), and that "the commercial power [of the federal government]
continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of discriminating legisla-
tion by reason of its foreign character. That power protects it, even after it has entered
the State, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin." Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 608 n.12 (1977), citing Welton v. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876).
" Since none of the states in which the plaintif exchanges are located taxes the
sale or transfer of securities, Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599,
604 (1977), § 270 created an incentive to sell out-of-state, thereby putting the New
York exchanges at a disadvantage. 97 S. Ct. at 607 n.11.
1 The "competitive disadvantage" argument was accepted by the Court of Ap-
peals of New York, which analogized § 270-a to state use taxes that have been sus-
tained by the Supreme Court as valid compensating legislation. Boston Stock Exch.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 542, 337 N.E.2d 758, 762, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314
(1975). See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). In Henneford.
the State of Washington imposed a 2% sales tax on all goods sold at retail in-state and
a 2% compensating tax on the use of goods in-state, for the purpose of discouraging
the incentive created by the sales tax for residents to purchase goods out-of-state. The
use tax did not apply when the goods had already been taxed by Washington at a rate
equal to or greater than 2%. The Supreme Court sustained the tax as a non-
discriminatory method of equalizing the tax burden laid upon in-state and out-of-state
purchases of goods. Id. at 584. See also General Trading Co. v. Iowa State Tax
Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANQE
that the sale would be made on a New York exchange in any event"2
when the sale is by a resident. With regard to out-of-state sales by
non-residents, the defendant relied on the lower court's finding that
since in-state sales by non-residents are themselves interstate trans-
actions, section 270-a did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce in favor of intrastate commerce; 9 rather, it imposed different
tax treatments upon two kinds of interstate commerce. 3 This type of
discrimination, the defendant implied, was permissible under the
commerce clause.
31
The Court rejected the defendent's argument concerning section
270-a's compensatory effect by reasoning that prior to the 1968
amendment the statute had no impact upon the decision as to where
the sale of securities was to take place.3" After the amendment, how-
ever, the favorable tax treatment afforded by section 270-a to in-state
sales became a significant factor in choosing the situs of the sale.
Thus, rather than compensating New York for a competitive disad-
vantage, the amendment foreclosed tax-neutral decisions and created
both an advantage for exchanges in New York and a burden to other
states." The Court acknowledged that section 270 in the absence of
the amendment did create a competitive disadvantage for the New
York exchanges, but noted that the state could constitutionally re-
2RBoston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 543, 337 N.E.2d 758,
762, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 314 (1975)(citation omitted). The appellee relied on the test
set forth in Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940): "The commerce clause
forbids discrimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our duty to
determine whether the statute under attack ... will in its practical operation work
discrimination against interstate commerce" (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
"The commerce clause forbids discrimination against interstate commerce by
providing a direct commercial advantage to local business. Northwestern States Port-
land Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959). To permit the individual
states to adopt legislation favoring intrastate commerce at the expense of out-of-state
businesses would encourage a "multiplication of preferential trade areas" inhibitory
of the purpose of the commerce clause- the protection of free trade among the states.
Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 380 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v.
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951).
10 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 543, 337 N.E.2d 758,
763, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315 (1975).
11 Brief for Appellees at 19, Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct.
599 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees]. ,
12Under the unamended version of § 270, an in-state transfer or delivery resulted
in a payment of tax not influenced by the situs of the sale; the latter factor resulted
in discriminatory tax treatment only after the advent of § 270-a. Boston Stock Exch.
v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 607 (1977). See text accompanying notes 19-22
supra.
11 97 S. Ct. at 607-08.
1977]
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move this disadvantage simply by declaring that sales would not be
a taxable event.
3 4
The Court distinguished the use tax cases relied on by the court
of appeals 3 by noting that in those cases an individual faced with the
choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase could make the choice
without regard to tax consequences. 6 Section 270-a, however, im-
posed greater liability on out-of-state sales than in-state sales, and
thus precluded the evenhanded treatment present in the use tax situ-
ation. The Court therefore concluded that the tax was inherently
discriminatory. 3
In addressing the state's contention that the amendment would
actually have had little practical effect on interstate commerce,3 the
Boston Stock Exchange Court made several responses. First, with
regard to residents who were engaged in out-of-state block sales of
securities,39 it stated that if the court of appeals' assumption as to
practical effect were true, there would have been no reason for the
legislature to have reduced the tax burden on in-state sales of resi-
dents as opposed to out-of-state sales." In fact, the legislative history
of section 270-a revealed that one of the primary reasons for enacting
the amendment was the recognition that many New York residents
were selling large blocks of stock on out-of-state exchanges, thereby
negating the assumption of the lower court.41 In addition, the Su-
l' Id. at 607 n.11. Since the state could thus achieve its goal without resorting to
a scheme of taxation that offends the commerce clause, this case apparently would be
controlled by prior decisions holding that the existence of reasonable, non-
discriminatory alternatives renders invalid the use of methods which discriminate
against interstate commerce. See Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottr'ell, 424 U.S.
366, 377 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 328 (1890). The Court's solution of eliminating sales as a taxable
event, however, would be viewed by New York as unsatisfactory in at least one respect:
taxation revenue would no longer be forthcoming from the situation where the securi-
ties sale occurs in New York but the transfer occurs out-of-state. See note 98 infra.
See note 27 supra.
3 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599, 608 (1977).
Id. at n.12.
3 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
11 Since the tax due on both in-state and out-of-state sales by residents was identi-
cal until the tax payable reached $350, see N.Y. TAX LAW § 270-a(1)&(2)(McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1976), the tax discrimination against out-of-state sales became operative
only when large or "block" transactions were made. Sales of securities in blocks of
10,000 shares or more comprised approximately 17% of the trading volume in securities
trading on the New York Stock Exchange in 1975. Large Blocks, N.Y. STocK ExcH.
DEP'T NEWSLETTER (Jan. 2, 1976).
4o 97 S. Ct. at 609.
4, Id. The legislative findings in connection with the adoption of § 270-a, 1968 N.Y.
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
preme Court noted that the potentially large disparity in tax amounts
owing on out-of-state sales by residents as opposed to in-state sales
4 2
could not be viewed as having a minimal practical effect on interstate
commerce.4 3 The Court concluded that as a result of this disparity,
investors making block transactions would be more likely to rely on
state-created economic incentives than on pure geographic proximity
in choosing the situs of the sale."
So far as the treatment by section 270-a of in-state and out-of-
state sales by non-residents is concerned,45 the Court agreed with the
interpretation of the court of appeals" that the discrimination in-
volved was not between interstate and intrastate commerce but
rather between two kinds of interstate commerce. 7 It stated that
there had been no prior occasion to address the question whether a
state may tax in a manner that discriminates between two types of
interstate transactions to favor local commercial interests,8 but
stated that such discrimination nonetheless violated the commerce
clause." Since a state may not enhance local commerce through une-
qual burdens upon the commerce of other states" the Court appar-
ently. concluded that any state law that has such discrimination as
Laws, ch. 827, § 1, stated that the amendment was necessary for "the retention within
the state of New York of sales involving large blocks of stock." Transactions of 10,000
or more shares on the regional exchanges increased by 202% in 1965-67 alone. Brief for
Appellees, supra note 31, at 5. See note 53 infra.
42 For an example of a transaction that would encompass such a disparity, see note
20 supra.
0 97 S. Ct. at 609.
' Id.
" Where the transaction involved a non-resident, it may have had the benefit of
both the discriminatory maximum tax on block sales and the 50% discount on the tax
payable, as opposed to a transaction made by a resident, who may have taken advan-
tage only of the maximum tax provision when making a block sale. See notes 20 & 21
supra.
' See text accompanying note 30 supra.
97 S. Ct. at 609. In the case of a sale by a non-resident, an order is sent to a
New York broker who executes it. Upon execution, the customer normally will send
his stock certificate by mail to the broker in fulfillment of his agreement to sell. When
the certificate crosses state lines by mail, the transaction qualifies as interstate in
character. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 535, 543, 337 N.E.2d
758, 763, 375 N.Y.S.2d 308, 315 (1975). A similar transaction was held to be an inter-
state sale in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946).
11 97 S. Ct. at 609.
4' Id.
See Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1976);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S.
434, 443 (1880).
19771
988 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIV
its end result must fall, regardless of whether the means employed
favor intrastate over interstate commerce or favor one interstate
transaction over another.5
In so holding, the Supreme Court struck down a law clearly viola-
tive of the commerce clause.52 The plain meaning of the legislative
findings indicated a desire to protect the New York securities indus-
try from competition by the plaintiff exchanges. 3 Indeed, the New
York Stock Exchange was so alarmed at the upsurge in out-of-state
trading 4 that it threatened to move from New York City if some tax
11 97 S. Ct. at 610. As support for its holding, the Court found Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), particularly relevant. 97 S. Ct. at 610 n.14. In
Baldwin, a New York statute forbade the in-state sale of milk imported from out-of-
state unless the price paid to the producers was at least equal to the minimum price
payable to New York producers. The state defended the law as necessary to assure the
economic health of local industry. The Court disagreed, stating:
If New York, in order to promote the economic welfare of her farmers,
may guard them against competition with the cheaper prices of Ver-
mont, the door has been opened to rivalries and reprisals that were
meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the
power of the nation.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). Insofar as § 270-a also repre-
sented an attempt by New York to protect a local industry, securities sales, from
foreign competition, Baldwin would seem directly controlling.
11 When it enacted § 270-a, the legislature also included a savings provision
whereby the invalidity of any part of the amendment does not negate the enforcement
of any other part. 1968 N.Y. Laws, ch. 827, § 10. In addition, the rates of taxation
imposed by the original tax law, N.Y. TAX LAw § 270 (McKinney 1966), are reimposed
without distinction between sales by residents and non-residents and without the $350
maximum tax limit on block sales. 1968 N.Y. Laws, ch. 827 § 11. The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower courts to determine which parts of § 270-a survived
its judgment in Boston Stock Exchange. 97 S. Ct. at 610 n.15.
The legislative findings stated in part:
The growth of exchanges in other regions of the country and the diver-
sion of business to those exchanges of individuals who are non-
residents of the state of New York requires that the tax on transfers
of stock. . . is an important contributing element to the diversion of
sales to other areas to the detriment of the economy of the state.
1968 N.Y. Laws, ch. 827, § 1. In approving ch. 827, the Governor of New York noted
that competition for the New York markets had been increased by the rise of regional
stock exchanges, and indicated that the purpose of the amendment was to "provide
long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State." 1968
Public Papers of Governor Rockefeller 552-54, reprinted in 1968 N.Y. Laws Vol. 2, at
2384 (McKinney), quoted in Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599,
605 n.10 (1977).
5, From 1965 to 1967, the volume of trading on regional exchanges increased by
73.2%. Regional "cross" volume (a transaction in which the broker finds both the buyer
and seller) increased 202% in the same period. Block transactions of 10,000 or more
shares on the regional exchanges also increased by 202%. Of the total share trading on
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relief was not forthcoming to ease New York's competitive disadvan-
tages. 5 Nonetheless, as vital as such state interests may be,"5 the
incentive provided by section 270-a for the making of sales in-state
was great enough virtually to require investors to trade in New York.517
As such, the statute closely resembled other laws which the Supreme
Court had struck down as requiring business operations to be per-
formed in the home state that could just as readily be performed
elsewhere. 8 Nor may the burden that had been imposed by section
270-a be constitutionally justified simply because the statute at-
tempted to neutralize a competitive disadvantage. 9
While Boston Stock Exchange thus seems compatible with the
principles of other commerce clause decisions, it appears inconsistent
with a recently-decided Supreme Court case also dealing with dis-
crimination in interstate commerce. At issue in Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corporation" was the constitutionality of a complex statutory
scheme designed to rid Maryland of abandoned automobiles. A study
the regional exchanges immediately prior to the enactment of § 270-a, 88% involved
New York Stock Exchange-listed securities. Statement of Robert W. Haack, President
of the New York Stock Exchange, on the Amendments to the New York Stock Transfer
Tax (New York City, March 4, 1968) reprinted in Motion to Dismiss of Appellee at
App. A, Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 97 S. Ct. 599 (1977).
55 Id.
0 Revenue to the City of New York from the transfer tax totalled $229 million for
fiscal 1968. The securities industry as a whole contributed $365.5 million in taxes in
1967. As of that time, the exchanges provided 50,000 jobs at a total payroll of $748
million, and paid $45 million in the rental of 6.5 million square feet of office space. Id.
17 This conclusion was prompted by the finding that "investors ... can be'ex-
pected to choose an exchange on the basis of services, prices, and other market condi-
tions rather than geographical proximity." 97 S. Ct. at 609. Even if this were not the
case, however, the Court noted that § 270-a would still offend the commerce clause,
since regardless of whether the tax advantage offered by § 270-a was the sole cause of
the injury to the regional exchanges, at the very least it reinforced the choice of an in-
state exchange and was an "inhibiting force" to the free flow of interstate commerce.
Id. at 609 n.13.
m See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963),
where a taxing scheme imposing a greater tax on persons using equipment in Louisiana
that they had manufactured out-of-state than on persons using equipment in Louis-
iana that they had manufactured in-state was struck down as requiring an out-of-state
operator to move his business in-state in order to compete on equal terms. See also
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), where the Court stated that "this
particular burden on commerce has been declared virtually per se illegal."
5' See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963)(tax
tending to "neutralize advantages" belonging to other states disapproved), citing
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935). But see note 24 supra.
10 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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commissioned by the state legislature" had determined that the two
main reasons for the in-state accumulation of junked cars were the
practice of wrecking companies to stockpile them for spare parts and
the low profits earned by wreckers for delivering vehicles to scrap
processors. To remedy this situation, Maryland enacted a statute"
requiring wreckers to obtain a license and pay a fine for any vehicle
of a certain age kept on their lots for more than one year. 3 In addi-
tion, the statute obligated the state to pay a bounty for each
Maryland-titled vehicle delivered to a licensed processor" for de-
struction. "5 As a condition for receiving the bounty, the processor
must submit to the state several documents proving his clear title to
the vehicle, " except in the case of inoperable vehicles over eight years
of age ("hulks"), which required no documentation of title. "
A 1974 amendment"6 to the law changed the documentation re-
quirements as to hulks. In-state processors are now required to sub-
mit only a document executed by the deliverer which certifies his own
right to the vehicle and indemnifies the processor against any third-
party claims for conversion. 9 Out-of-state processors, however, are
required to submit much more elaborate documentation, correspond-
ing to that required for abandoned vehicles in general." The appellee,
" MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE CouNcnL COMMITTEE ON TAXATION AND FISCAL MATTERS,
1967 REPORT, at 60-70.
62 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2 §§ 5-201-5-210 (1970).
Id. at §§ 5-201, 5-202, 5-203(d).
" There is no residency requirement for scrap processors who wish to participate
in the bounty program and be licensed by the state. The-only statutory requirements
for licensing involve standards for vehicle storage areas, processing equipment, and
bookkeeping. Id. at § 5-202. Out-of-state processors must maintain an in-state office
approved by the state department of motor vehicles. MD. ADMIN. R.R. § 11.-02- 05.45.
Seven of the sixteen scrap processors that have participated in the program are located
out-of-state. 426 U.S. at 799.
11 MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2 § 5-205 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1976). The bounty is
$16 per vehicle, to be shared equally by the licensed processor and the licensed wrecker.
If the supplier is other than a licensed wrecker, the processor receives the entire fee.
Id.
go Where the supplier is a licensed wrecker, the documentation takes the form of
a "wrecker's certificate" supplied to the processor. Id. at § 5-203(b),(c). Suppliers other
than licensed wreckers must provide either an endorsed certificate of title, a police
certificate vesting title in accord with statutory notice provisions, or a bill of sale from
a police auction. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(f) (1-4), 11-1002.2(a-d)(Cum.
Supp. 1976).
67 Id. at § 11-1002.2(f)(5). Approximately 96% of all bounty-eligible vehicles
scrapped by the processors are hulks. 426 U.S. at 801.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, § 11-1002.2(f)(5)(Cum. Supp. 1976).
I9 d.
" Id. See note 62 supra.
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an out-of-state processor, charged that this greater documentation
requirement induced suppliers to deliver hulks to in-state processors,
thereby causing a considerable decline in the appellee's business.' By
thus giving Maryland processors an advantage over out-of-state busi-
nesses, the amendment was alleged to discriminate unconstitu-
tionally against interstate commerce.
2
While the lower court granted relief to the appellee, 3 the Supreme
Court reversed. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, con-
ceded that the amendment has burdened interstate commerce."
Nonetheless, the Court declined to hold the law unconstitutional for
the sole reason that Maryland's action was not "the kind of action
with which the Commerce Clause is concerned." 6 As in Boston Stock
Exchange, the Court noted that the situation presented to it was one
of first impression.7 It characterized past decisions under the com-
merce clause where state regulations were struck down because of
their burdening effect78 as involving state interference with the inter-
state market through prohibition or regulation.7 The Court then dis-
tinguished Alexandria Scrap by stating that Maryland had not
sought to regulate or prohibit the interstate flow of hulks, but instead
had entered into the market to bid up their price. Maryland had
made it more lucrative for unlicensed suppliers to dispose of their
hulks in-state rather than out-of-state. 0
11 During the six-month period immediately following the effective date of the
amendment, July 1, 1974, the amount of bounty-eligible hulks delivered to appellee
dropped 31.8%. The number of hulks delivered by unlicensed suppliers, who could not
enjoy the benefit of the easily procurable wrecker's certificates, declined by 54.9%. 426
U.S. at 801 n.11 and 802 n.12.
7Z Id. at 802.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md. 1975). See note 82
infra.
71 426 U.S. at 814. The trial court also accepted the argument that the amendment
denied appellee equal protection of the laws under U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, but the
Supreme Court reversed that holding also. 426 U.S. at 814.
7' Id. at 807.
7, Id. at 805.
Id. at 807. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
7' See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (requirement that
fresh fruit grown in-state be packed there before shipment interstate held invalid);
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (denial of license to milk
distributor to process milk in-state for immediate shipment out-of-state held violative
of commerce clause); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (state
statute forbidding export of shrimp until processed in-state struck down); Pennsyl-
vania v. West Va., 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (requirement that in-state producers of natural
gas supply all domestic needs before shipping out-of-state held invalid).
7, 426 U.S. at 808.
"Id.
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Thus, the state's entrance into the market as a purchaser, a factor
not present in Boston Stock Exchange, was sufficient to validate a
statute the practical effect of which is to favor intrastate commerce
over interstate commerce. Maryland's principal argument in favor of
the amendment was that it tends to reduce the amount of state funds
flowing to out-of-state processors for the destruction of Maryland-
titled hulks.81 In addition, however, the statute serves to require out-
of-state processors to conduct their businesses in-state in order to
compete effectively with Maryland processors.82 This result, con-
demned in prior cases,83 was also the factor which led the Court in
Boston Stock Exchange to invalidate the New York transfer tax."
Nevertheless, the majority in Alexandria Scrap held that "[n]othing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause forbids a State...
from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens over others." 5
The issue framed by these two decisions seems apparent: what
factors compel the conclusion that a tax advantage given to protect
local industry is invalid, yet a statutory scheme designed to give
government subsidies so as to protect local industry is valid? Three
possible factors in Alexandria Scrap merit examination. The first is
the entrance by the state into the market in the role of a restrictive
purchaser of items in interstate commerce. 6 Attacks on statutes
which give states rights to prefer the purchasing of goods produced
" Id. at 812.
" The trial court found this aspect of the statute to be one of the main grounds
for declaring the amendment unconstitutional, noting that a state may not lawfully
require "an out-of-state operator to become a resident in order to compete on equal
terms" with in-state businesses. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46,60
(D. Md. 1975), citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72
(1963). While the lower court acknowledged the legitimacy of the state's desire to
conserve subsidy payments in cases where hulks are abandoned outside of Maryland,
it concluded that this goal could not be rationally achieved by the 1974 amendment.
Instead, the court viewed the practical effect of the differing documentation require-
ments relating to in-state and out-of-state processors not only as establishing a sub-
stantial burden on interstate commerce, but also as an attempt to protect in-state
operators from outside competition. 391 F. Supp. at 62-63.
83 See note 78 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 54 & 55 supra.
426 U.S. at 810. The Court noted that the appellee is free at any time to
withdraw from the bounty program if its benefits do not justify the annual license fee.
The Court distinguished the appellee's position from that of a foreign business that
enters a state as the result of private market forces but is thereafter burdened with
discriminatory regulation or taxation. Id. at 810 n.20.
0 See text accompanying notes 77 & 82 supra.
BOSTON STOCK EXCHANGE
in-state over those produced out-of-state" have generally failed.88
However, those situations involved the purchase of items of com-
merce for end use. 9 As the dissent in Alexandria Scrap points out,"0
Maryland was not engaged in buying products for end use, and the
general presumption that such statutes are constitutional should not
apply in this case.8 The situation in Boston Stock Exchange was not
predicated upon New York's purchasing power in the securities in-
dustry. Instead, the issue was New York's use of the taxing power to
further economic protectionism. Nonetheless, in both cases an end
sought was the fostering of local industry, and the means used to
achieve this goal discriminated against interstate commerce. Since
the Alexandria Scrap Court's reliance upon the state's proprietary
purchasing power as a distinguishing factor was not explained by
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 283.03 (West 1975), which provides in part that
"[a]ll the public printing of this state shall be done in the state. .. ."
R See Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U.S. 618 (1904) (power of town
aldermen under a state statute to specify purchase of foreign asphalt over domestic
upheld); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd mem.
409 U.S. 904 (1972)(state statute requiring public printing of state to be performed in-
state upheld). But see Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126
(1966), noted in 80 HARv. L. REv. 1357 (1967), where the court refused to declare as
valid per se a state statute requiring any milk seller who sold milk to a state agency
to certify that during the preceding year he purchased fresh milk produced in New
Jersey in an amount at least equal to the amount being sold by him to the state. See
generally McAllister, Court, Congress and Trade Barriers, 16 IN. L.J. 144, 164-65
(1940); Melder, The Economics of Trade Barriers, 16 LND. L.J. 127, 139-41 (1940).
" See cases cited in note 88 supra.
"426 U.S. at 824 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 See American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla.
1972) (court acknowledged that "proprietary statutes imposing restraints had hereto-
fore been presumed to place only reasonable and insubstantial burdens on interstate
commerce"). But see Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126,
130 (1966). When a state purchases products for end use, it may impose whatever
conditions or qualifications it deems desirable under the rule that a contract cannot
be made without the consent and agreement of both contracting parties. See MacMil-
lan Co. v. Johnson, 269 F. 28, 31 (E.D. Mich. 1920). However, Maryland is not engaged
in end-use purchasing. Rather, through the payment of bounties the state is influenc-
ing only one aspect of a flow of interstate commerce that begins prior to the state's
regulation and continues subsequently. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 824 (1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, Maryland's role in the scrap-
processing market is not that of a contracting party but of a regulating force which
provides an incentive to divert processing to in-state locations. As such, the state
should not enjoy the presumption that any restraints it imposes on interstate com-
merce will result in only insubstantial burdens, since the effects of those restraints
extend beyond Maryland's own activities in the scrap market to a larger area of the
interstate commerce in scrap metal. Id. at 824 n.6.
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thorough analysis92 and could not be directly supported by preced-
ent," this latter factor does not seem sufficiently important to compel
a result different from that reached in Boston Stock Exchange.
A second ground for distinguishing the two cases is that in
Alexandria Scrap the basic statutory scheme embodied a clearly le-
gitimate interest: the improvement of the environment by ridding the
state of abandoned automobiles. 4 Similarly, the asserted purpose of
the amendment was to ensure that bounty payments are limited to
hulks abandoned within Maryland, and that public funds are not
dispersed to aid the clearance of vehicles abandoned in other states. 5
The purpose of the amendment at issue in Boston Stock Exchange
was the encouragement of the New York securities industry and the
avoidance of the considerable loss of jobs and revenue that would
occur if the exchanges were to move out-of-state.6 Thus, while Mary-
land's ultimate goal seems somewhat less economically motivated, in
qualitative terms the two public interests appear equally valid.
Where valid public interests are present, the Court has held that the
question becomes one of degree, and the extent of the burden on
interstate commerce that will be tolerated depends on the nature of
the purpose involved and on whether it could be promoted as effi-
ciently with a lesser impact on interstate activities.17 In both Boston
Stock Exchange and Alexandria Scrap, the local purposes were com-
pelling and presumably could have been promoted by methods hav-
ing a lesser impact on interstate commerce." However, the fact that
, The lack of detailed analysis by the majority in Alexandria Scrap disturbed the
dissenting justices, who urged a remand to ascertain additional facts concerning the
practical effects of the amendment. Id. at 824-26, 829-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13 See text accompanying notes 88 and 89 supra. Prior cases dealing with states'
proprietary purchasing power concerned items bought for end use. unlike the situation
in Alexandria Scrap. See note 91 supra.
See 426 U.S. at 811.
9 Id. at 809.
" See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
'T Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 372 (1976); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
,1 New York could have erased the competitive disadvantage inherent in §270
simply by declaring that sales would not be a taxable event. See text accompanying
note 34 supra. Other methods of providing tax relief to persons making in-state sales
of securities conceivably could include a deduction on state personal income tax, see,
e.g., N.Y. TAx LAW § 615(d)(2)(McKinney 1975), or a credit against tax due by a
corporation making in-state sales of securities, see, e.g., N.Y. TAx LAW §
210(4)(2)(McKinney Supp. 1976). These alternatives are different in form from the
type of tax relief afforded by § 270-a, but their effect on interstate commerce appear
equally inhibitory. Thus, elimination of sales as a taxable event under § 270 is probably
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New York's basic interests were economic while Maryland's were
environmental should not have been influential.
Third, the Court in Alexandria Scrap noted that the interstate
commerce affected by the Maryland amendment appeared to have
been created by the bounty scheme itself.55 That is, prior to the initia-
tion of the subsidy program, the movement of hulks across state lines
might have been too small to be significant. The very offering by
Maryland of the subsidies increased the interstate flow.' 0 The Court
stated that it would hesitate to hold that the commerce clause forbids
state action interfering with a flow of commerce dependent for its
existence upon state subsidies.10' In Boston Stock Exchange, however,
the interstate movement was substantial and in no way dependent
upon a state subsidy for its existence. Nonetheless, this distinction
cannot support the result in Alexandria Scrap, since the Court there
concluded that the issue was not clearly presented, due to an insuffi-
cient record concerning the details of the hulk market prior to the
commencement of the bounty scheme.' 2
Thus, the differences in the methods used by Maryland and New
York to encourage local industry,'03 in the ultimate legislative goals
sought' 4 and in the direct control exerted by the states upon the
the most reasonable solution, since any transaction involving the transfer of securities
in-state would still be taxable.
The trial court in Alexandria Scrap suggested that Maryland could have accom-
plished its purpose of reducing the flow of state subsidies out-of-state by conditioning
the bounty upon a hulk's abandonment in Maryland instead of its being titled there.
Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46, 63 (D. Md. 1975). While such an
alternative would have substantially eliminated the interstate commerce, see text
accompanying notes 99-100 infra, this result would be unobjectionable, since "the
Commerce Clause surely does not impose on the States any obligation to subsidize out
of-state business." 426 U.S. at 815-16 (Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent's desire
to remand the case was founded in part upon a desire to determine the reasonable
alternatives, if any, available to Maryland to accomplish the amendment's legislative
purpose. Id. at 829 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 809 n.18.
100 The theory that Maryland itself was the creator of the interstate market in
hulks was the foundation of the concurring opinion in Alexandria Scrap. See Id. at 815
(Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent took issue with the concurrence's conclusion,
stating that "the evidence and legal arguments are to the contrary." Id. at 824 n.6
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The issue probably should not have been raised at all, since
the record was devoid of any facts upon which such a conclusion could be based. 426
U.S. at 809 n.18.
I01 Id.
102 Id.
113 See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
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volume of the particular type of commerce concerned' 5 do not explain
adequately the opposite conclusions reached in Boston Stock
Exchange and Alexandria Scrap. A final distinction between the two
cases might lie in the national importance and breadth of the securi-
ties industry as compared to the restricted and localized nature of the
interstate commerce in abandoned vehicles. A burden upon the latter
type of commerce in the pursuit of a legitimate public interest could
be viewed as more tolerable than a burden upon the former, simply
because of the volume and importance of the interstate activity in-
volved in each. However, such a distinction is not convincing. The
validity of restraints on interstate commerce should not depend solely
upon the scope of the particular activity concerned. While the degree
of inhibition upon a given type of interstate commerce is a crucial
factor,' 6 the actual volume of that interstate activity, be it the na-
tionwide securities industry or the destruction of one state's aban-
doned automobiles, should not be determinative. In addition, the
special treatment given by Alexandria Scrap to a state which enters
the interstate market not as a regulator but as a purchaser could
prove troublesome in future cases where states may seek immuniza-
tion from the commerce clause through adoption of a "purchasing"
role. 07 While Boston Stock Exchange"8 seems consistent with prior
interpretations of the commerce clause,"9 Alexandria Scrap indicates
that more detailed clarification is needed to determine the type of
methods a state may constitutionally employ to give commercial ad-
vantages to its own citizens in interstate commerce.
DAvID P. FALCK
,. See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
105 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
,0 See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 784, 824 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
lag It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice White, who concurred in the dissenting
opinion in Alexandria Scrap, wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court in Boston
Stock Exchange. Alexandria Scrap was not mentioned in Boston Stock Exchange.
"I See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
